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International Asylum and Boat People: The 










On August 26, 2001, the Norwegian cargo ship MV Tampa rescued 
433 ―boat people‖1 from the distressed Indonesian fishing vessel 
Palapa, off the coast of Christmas Island, Australia. The Australian 
government summarily denied the passengers access to its territory. 
The boat people were mostly refugees2 fleeing war-torn Afghanistan. 
 
† Executive Notes Editor, Maryland Journal of International Law 2009–10; 
J.D., University of Maryland School of Law, May 2010. The author wishes to 
thank Sarah Winter, Adam Walkaden, and the staff of the Australian Law Reform 
Commission for their inspiration. 
1. The term ―boat people‖ originated in the 1970s to describe migrants fleeing 
Vietnam. Investigators use it to describe refugees who, secretly and illegally, depart 
their countries on overcrowded, unseaworthy vessels. Jacqueline Marie Hall, Sink 
or Swim: The Deadly Consequences of People Smuggling, 12 IND. INT‘L & COMP. 
L. REV. 365, 367 n.18 (2002) (citing Josh Briggs, Sur Place Refugee Status in the 
Context of Vietnamese Asylum Seekers in Hong Kong, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 433, 437 
(1993)). 
2. ―Refugees‖ are defined in Article I of the 1951 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art I, July 28, 
1951, 189 U.S.T. 150, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]. 
Refugees are persons who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion, are outside their country of nationality and unable or unwilling to seek 
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They had sailed from western Indonesia with the help of hired human 
traffickers, and Australia wanted them returned to their point of 
embarkation. The result was a standoff at the edge of Australian 
territorial waters.  
After several days in the water, the asylum seekers3 persuaded the 
Tampa’s Captain, Arne Rinnan, to attempt a landing in Australia. The 
Australian government, led by Prime Minister John Howard, never 
permitted the landing despite Rinnan‘s August 29, 2001 request for 
urgent medical attention to a number of passengers. Instead, Australia 
dispatched its Special Air Service (SAS) to intercept and seize the 
Tampa after the ship disregarded radio warnings and entered 
Australian territorial waters.4  
The Australian government‘s hard-line stance during the Tampa 
affair marked the dawn of a prolonged state policy aimed at deterring 
future asylum seekers that held sway until a change in political 
leadership in 2007. Though the Howard government‘s tough posture 
drew world-wide condemnation, it galvanized the governing Liberal 
Party of Australia to harden its stance on immigration in the midst of 
a re-election campaign.5 The seized passengers were confined to the 
Tampa and left on the sea for weeks. The events of September 11, 
2001 soon overshadowed news of the standoff and the plight of the 
refugees and ushered in a general climate of suspicion and 
vulnerability in Australia.  
Australia instituted significant, ad hoc border policy changes in 
response to the Tampa incident that remained in place for years. The 
Parliament pushed through a series of legislative enactments, now 
 
protection from that country. Id.      
3. ―Asylum‖—or ―political asylum‖—is defined as the ―[p]rotection of . . . 
political refugees from arrest by a foreign jurisdiction; a nation or embassy that 
affords such protection.‖ BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 121 (7th ed. 1999). Asylum 
usually involves a country providing protection to refugees on its territory. At the 
least, asylum means protection from ―refoulement,‖ the forced repatriation of 
individuals to countries where their lives or freedoms are threatened. Asylum 
seekers generally must meet the legal definition of a refugee to be afforded such 
protection.    
4. MV Tampa Captain Arne Rinnan was threatened with heavy human 
trafficking penalties set out in the Migration Act, see infra note 7, if he disobeyed 
Australia‘s order to not enter its territorial waters. The Tampa‘s chronology reads: 
―Advised if the vessel enters Australian territorial waters it would be breaking the 
migration law and will be subject to prosecution and fines up to A$110,000 and 
jail.‖ DAVID MARR & MARIAN WILKINSON, DARK VICTORY 31 (2004). 
5. See generally MARR & WILKINSON, supra note 4. 
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known as the ―Pacific Solution,‖6 to avoid bringing the rescued 
passengers ashore and triggering the machinery of the 1958 
Australian Migration Act (Migration Act).7 Whereas in the past, 
reaching Australian territory would have afforded the refugees the 
opportunity to access Australian courts of law, under the Pacific 
Solution, the territories of Christmas Island, Ashmore Reef, and the 
Cocos Islands were excised from the purview of the Migration Act. 
This legislative action denied refugees who reached outlying parts of 
Australia the right to seek asylum. Further, the Pacific Solution 
directed the Australian Navy to intercept and transport arriving boat 
people to detention camps on small islands for formal processing and 
detention. 
Australia is party to a number of international conventions and 
protocols designed to protect the rights of refugees and asylum 
seekers. Foremost among these are the 1951 Convention and Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention),8 the 1966 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),9 the 
1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),10 and the 1984 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane and 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT).11 These conventions 
are forms of agreement between nations that are binding in 
international law. The role of international law, which governs the 
relationships between countries, is to act as a referee for states that 
voluntarily agree to adhere to customary principles of behavior that 
are acceptable to the international community. Although no police 
 
6. Australia‘s ―Pacific Solution‖ entailed the interminable displacement of 
asylum seekers arriving by boat to various Pacific island detention facilities—
regardless of the legitimacy of their claims. See infra Part IV. 
7. Migration Act (1958), No. 62 (Austl.) (amended 2008, No. 85) [hereinafter 
Migration Act]. Section 4(1) states that: ―(1) The object of this Act is to regulate, in 
the national interest, the coming into, and presence in, Australia of non-citizens.‖ 
Id. The Migration Act is the primary piece of legislation that incorporates into 
domestic law Australia‘s obligations as a ratifying party to the 1951 United Nations 
Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. See infra note 25 and 
accompanying text. 
8. Refugee Convention, supra note 2. 
9. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
10. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter CRC]. 
11. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, 1465 
U.N.T.S. 85. 
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force exists to punish countries which breach their international legal 
obligations, the international community may choose to respond to 
violations through sanctions or military intervention.12 
In addition, the international community has agreed to customary 
methods of interpretation of public international law. The 
fundamental rule of treaty interpretation is expressed in Article 31 of 
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna 
Convention): ―A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.‖13  
This Comment explores the Australian retreat from its international 
treaty commitments during the Tampa affair through (1) the 
introduction of applicable international agreements; (2) reflection on 
the source and justification of government-asserted authority to 
disregard its international obligations; and (3) an examination of legal 
issues concerning interdiction of vessels at sea and the practice of 
indefinite removal of persons to third countries. The Comment 
contends that the rescued passengers of the Palapa were entitled to 
seek asylum in Australia because they met the definition of a refugee 
under the Refugee Convention.14 The Tampa proceedings revealed a 
disturbing lack of justiciability of international norms in Australian 
courts.  
II. INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND TREATIES APPLICABLE TO 
ASYLUM SEEKERS ARRIVING BY BOAT  
The frequency of human trafficking to facilitate illegal 
immigration into Western, democratic countries has risen sharply 
since the 1990s.15 The United Nations High Commission for 
 
12. AUSTRALIAN LAWYERS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, AUSTRALIAN LAWYERS FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS REFUGEE LAW KIT 2004 ch. 2 (2004), http://www.alhr.asn.au/refug 
eekit/downloads/chapters_all.pdf [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS REFUGEE LAW KIT]. 
13. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331. States are further required to carry out their treaty obligations in good faith. Id. 
art. 26 (―Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties and must be performed by 
them in good faith.‖). 
14. See infra notes 25–32 and accompanying text. 
15. In the year 2000, more than 150 million international migrants lived outside 
their countries, with more than half residing in developing countries. 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION, WORLD MIGRATION REPORT 
2000 (Susan F. Martin ed., 2000), http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/cache/offonce/pid 
/1674?entryId=7279. The smuggling of human migrants means ―the procurement, 
in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the 
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Refugees (UNHCR) expects this trend to continue, citing military 
conflict, poverty, unemployment, and limited opportunities for legal 
migration as key motivating factors for human trafficking, now a 
worldwide, multi-billion-dollar industry.16 By the time the Tampa 
arrived in Australia in 2001, the government was already deeply 
committed to anti-human-trafficking efforts. Years of diplomatic 
pressure had resulted in coordinated enforcement initiatives with 
Indonesia, a well-known point of departure for undocumented 
migrants arriving in Australia.17  
A. Sea Rescue 
Australia‘s obligations to refugees arriving by boat include the 
granting of basic humanitarian assistance to vessels in distress, the 
provision of due process rights, and the right to petition for asylum in 
a court of law.18 Australia is party to the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which codified formal 
international rules of sea rescue.19 Article 98 of UNCLOS pertains to 
the duty to render assistance to persons and vessels in distress: 
1. Every State shall require the master of a ship flying its flag, 
in so far as he can do so without serious danger to the ship, the 
crew or the passengers: 
  (a) to render assistance to any person found at sea in danger 
of being lost; 
  (b) to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of 
persons in distress, if informed of their need of assistance, in 
 
illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a 
permanent resident.‖ Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and 
Air Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime art. 3, Nov. 15, 2000, U.N. Doc. A/55/383 [hereinafter Protocol 
against the Smuggling of Migrants]. 
16. ADRIENNE MILLBANK, PARLIAMENT OF AUSTRALIA PARLIAMENTARY 
LIBRARY, BOAT PEOPLE, ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM SEEKERS: IN 
PERSPECTIVE (1999), http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/cib/1999- 
2000/2000cib13.htm. 
17. Several hundred boat people had arrived in Australia each year since the 
1970‘s but by 2001, the numbers had risen to several thousand. MARR & 
WILKINSON, supra note 4, at 38. Australians saw arriving boat people as illegal 
immigrants with no visas, and even as wealthy for making the journey with the help 
of human traffickers. Id. 
18. Migration Act, supra note 7. Immigration to Australia is controlled by the 
Migration Act and its regulations. Id.   
19. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 3, 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
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so far as such action may reasonably be expected of him.‖20 
Article 98 was incorporated into Australian domestic law as 
Section 317A of the country‘s Navigation Act, enacted in 1912.21  
Tampa Captain Arne Rinnan adhered to Article 98‘s guidelines 
when he acknowledged the mayday of the Palapa and radioed to 
advise Australian authorities of his boat‘s change of course to head 
for the ―position of distress.‖22 As master of a passing cargo ship on 
the high seas, Rinnan relied on the commitment of Australia to treat 
boat people according to the international rules of sea rescue, as 
codified in UNCLOS. More than two hours after Rinnan‘s radio 
communication, Australian authorities continued to evade 
responsibility for the sea rescue operation. Officials advised Rinnan 
that ―Indonesian search and rescue authorities have accepted 
coordination of this incident‖23 but did not provide Rinnan with any 
indication of where he could land survivors.24  
B. Treatment of Refugees 
As a ratifying party to the Refugee Convention,25 Australia bound 
itself to conform to international law regarding the treatment of 
arriving refugees. While the Refugee Convention is largely silent on 
the procedural aspects of application for admission as a refugee,26 
Article 33 does prohibit the ―refoulement‖ of a refugee to the border 
of a country where his ―life or freedom would be threatened.‖ This 
section of the Refugee Convention states that ―[n]o Contracting State 
 
20. Id. art. 98. 
21. MARR & WILKINSON, supra note 4, at 21 n.9.  
22. Id. at 18 n.1. 
23. Documents provided under Freedom of Information legislation by the 
Australian Maritime Safety Authority related to the Palapa rescue. MARR & 
WILKINSON, supra note 4, at 19 n.2. 
24. MARR & WILKINSON, supra note 4, at 22 n.10. 
25. Refugee Convention, supra note 2, art. I. The treaty was ratified by 
Australia on December 13, 1973, with the following reservation: ―The Government 
of Australia will not extend the provisions of the Protocol to Papua/New Guinea.‖ 
Id. The 1967 Protocol provided a generic international refugee agreement, 
removing a shortfall in the 1951 Convention where the definition of ―refugee‖ was 
limited to those who had fled events in Europe occurring before January 1, 1951. 
See Refugee Convention, supra note 2, art. 1. When Australia ratified the 1967 
Protocol, it became derivatively bound by the 1951 Convention, obligating 
Australia to respect all refugee rights under the 1951 Convention.   
26. Nothing in the 1951 Convention requires any state to admit overseas 
refugees. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 
926 (4th ed. 2005).  
FOX MACRO - 05-11-10 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/27/2010  2:50 PM 
362 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 25:356 
shall expel or return (‗refouler‘) a refugee in any manner whatsoever 
to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership 
of a particular social group or political opinion.‖27 
In its general provisions, the Refugee Convention grants certain 
rights to persons that meet the definition of a refugee. Chapter 2 
grants ―Juridical Status‖ rights to refugees, including the Article 16 
right to ―free access to the courts of law on the territory of all 
Contracting States.‖28 The administrative measures guaranteed in 
Chapter 5 include the Article 26 right to freedom of movement once 
a refugee is lawfully within a Contracting State’s territory.29 
Australia made certain that Article 26 could not be invoked when it 
prevented the Tampa from landing the rescued asylum seekers on its 
territory and concurrently denied them the Article 16 right to access 
Australian courts.30 
Perhaps one of the most important rights granted to refugees under 
the Refugee Convention is the prohibition against penalizing asylum 
seekers based on the manner of their arrival to the country where they 
are seeking protection.31 This Comment argues that the rescued 
passengers of the Palapa met the definition of a refugee under the 
Refugee Convention and its modifying Protocol,32 and therefore they 
were entitled to seek asylum in countries that have agreed to be 
bound by its principles. 
Still, compliance with the Refugee Convention alone is insufficient 
if a country is party to additional treaties that protect the general 
population. Other international agreements provide additional rights 
to refugees and asylum seekers. For the inhabitants of Australia, the 
ICCPR, the CRC, and OPCAT provide many essential rights, 
including: the right to liberty and security of person; freedom from 
arbitrary arrest or detention; freedom from torture, cruel, inhumane, 
or degrading treatment; the right to equal protection under the law; 
the right not to be expelled, returned or extradited to a country where 
 
27. Refugee Convention, supra note 2, art. 33. 
28. Id. art. 16 (emphasis added). 
29. Id. art. 26 (emphasis added). 
30. When the Norwegian ambassador to Australia was permitted to board the 
Tampa the refugees passed him a letter, addressed to the people of Australia, 
appealing for asylum. MARR & WILKINSON, supra note 4, at 151–54 n.16. 
31. Refugee Convention, supra note 2, art. 31. 
32. See supra note 25. 
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the person would be in danger of being tortured; the right of children 
to have their best interests considered by welfare institutions, courts 
of law, or administrative authorities; the right of children to apply to 
enter or leave a country for the purpose of family reunification; and 
the right of children to express their own views in any judicial or 
administrative proceedings.33 
On December 10, 1948, the UN General Assembly ratified a 
catalog of the ―inalienable rights of all members of the human 
family‖ in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).34 
Although the UDHR was conceived as a statement of objectives to be 
pursued by all governments, the Declaration is not technically part of 
legally binding international law, and there are no signatories.35 The 
principles upheld by the Declaration, however, wield power in the 
form of moral and diplomatic pressure on members of the 
international community.36 Among the list of civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural rights entitled to all peoples is the right 
to seek asylum from persecution.‖37 Australia spurned its obligations 
under the UDHR when it failed to provide the Palapa refugees the 
right to a legal avenue to petition for asylum. 
III. EXERCISE OF EXECUTIVE POWER 
Australia‘s intolerant stance towards boat people reached a climax 
in 2001 because of the politically sensitive timing of the Tampa 
 
33. HUMAN RIGHTS REFUGEE LAW KIT, supra note 12. Canberra frustrated 
efforts by the International Red Cross, who had assembled and transported a 
civilian doctor, nurse, and translator team, to board the Tampa to address basic 
humanitarian needs. MARR & WILKINSON, supra note 4, at 151. 
34. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, para. 1, U.N. Doc. 
A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].  
35. Tai-Heng Cheng, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights at Sixty: Is it 
Still Right for the United States?, 41 CORNELL INT‘L L.J. 251, 251–53 (2008). 
36. See Nat‘l Coordinating Comm. for UDHR50, Questions and Answers about 
the UDHR (1998), http://www.udhr.org/history/question.htm (―While the record 
shows that most of those who adopted the UDHR did not imagine it to be a legally 
binding document, the legal impact of the Universal Declaration has been much 
greater than perhaps any of its framers had imagined.‖). In 1968, the United 
Nations International Conference on Human Rights in Tehran met to review the 
progress made in the twenty years since the adoption of Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, 
Teheran, Iran, April 22–May 13, 1968, Proclamation of Tehran, at 3, U.N. Doc. 
A/Conf. 32/41. They declared that the Declaration ―constitutes an obligation for the 
members of the international community‖ to protect the rights of their citizens. Id.  
37. ―Everyone has the right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from 
persecution.‖ UDHR, supra note 34, art. 33. 
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incident. It occurred during the run-up to the Liberal Party of 
Australia‘s re-election campaign.38 The Howard government 
launched a massive public relations campaign vilifying refugees who 
arrive by boat as undeserving of admission into Australia. The 
Liberal Party of Australia also stoked a growing public fear that 
allowing unwanted refugees to access the country‘s legal immigration 
scheme would overrun the system and disadvantage its citizenry 
economically.39 Legally, the government invoked its executive power 
under Australia‘s Commonwealth Constitution40 to justify the forcible 
seizure of the Tampa as well as the removal and detention of the 
refugees aboard.  
Australia‘s seizure of the Tampa and prevention of boat people 
from accessing Australian territory were challenged in Victorian 
Council for Civil Liberties Inc. v. Minister for Immigration & 
Multicultural Affairs.41 The Victorian Council for Civil Liberties, a 
leading Australian human rights and civil liberties organization, 
initially secured the refugees‘ release by filing a writ of habeas 
corpus. Justice North ordered that ―the respondents release those 
persons rescued at sea who were brought on board MV Tampa on or 
about 26 August 2001 . . . and bring those persons ashore to a place 
on the mainland of Australia.‖42  
On appeal, Chief Justice Michael Eric John Black, Justice Bryan 
Beaumont, and Justice Robert Shenton French of Australia‘s Federal 
Court directly considered the issue of the federal government‘s 
authority to seize the Tampa.43 The legitimacy of the seizure under 
Australian law, as they framed the issue, involved two secondary 
questions: (1) did the Commonwealth government have the authority 
to seize the Tampa to prevent boat people from landing in Australia 
 
38. MARR & WILKINSON, supra note 4, at 151 (―The Liberal poster in 2001 
showed a resolute John Howard with his fists clenched, flanked by flags. The 
message was: ‗WE DECIDE WHO COMES TO THIS COUNTRY AND THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH THEY COME’ . . . . Huge advertisements showing 
the same determined Howard defending his country against invading boat people 
appeared that morning in all the major newspapers of Australia.‖). 
39. Widespread fear of illegal immigration was easily stoked, and often carried 
racist overtones: ―Nascent racism, ancient fears of invasion by immigration and 
talkback radio ranting against Asian crime were about to fuse into a new 
extraordinarily potent political force.‖ Id. at 123. 
40. Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1974 (Austl.). 
41. (2001) 182 A.L.R. 617 (Austl.).  
42. Id. at 655.  
43. Ruddock v. Vadarlis (2001) 183 A.L.R. 1, 6 (Austl.).  
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in the absence of a federal statute granting such power, and (2) if the 
authority existed, was it abolished and/or superseded by the country‘s 
Migration Act?44  
Ultimately, the Federal Court reversed the trial court decision and 
denied the writ of habeas corpus, holding that the Migration Act had 
neither extinguished nor limited the government‘s executive power.45 
Central to the court‘s decision was the scope and capacity of the 
Commonwealth‘s executive power.  
Although Section 61 of the Commonwealth Constitution provides 
that ―the executive power of the Commonwealth is vested in the 
Queen and is exercisable by the Governor-General,‖ the scope of the 
executive power is never expressly defined.46 Justices French and 
Beaumont, writing for the majority, concluded that the executive 
power was a separate concept from the old prerogative power.47 They 
differentiated it and asserted the right to exclude aliens as a necessary 
implication that can only be abrogated by ―clear [statutory] intent,‖ 
which was not made apparent by the Migration Act.48 Justice Black, 
in his dissent, argued that any Commonwealth executive power was 
limited to a defunct common law prerogative power,49 now 
superseded by the Migration Act.50 
Two positions can be taken to resolve the meaning of executive 
 
44. Bradley Selway, All at Sea—Constitutional Assumptions and “The 
Executive Power of the Commonwealth”, 31 FED. L. REV. 495, 496 (2003). Selway 
argues that Australia‘s Commonwealth Constitution includes an inadequately 
defined legal concept of executive power, and therefore the decision in Ruddock v. 
Vadarlis rested on an assumption as to what considerations are relevant in 
determining its scope and meaning. Id. at 506. 
45. Ruddock, 183 A.L.R. at 27.  
46. Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1974, c. 2, § 61. 
47. See infra note 49. 
48. Ruddock, 183 A.L.R. at 49. The court asserted that ―[t]he executive power 
of the Commonwealth under [Section] 61 cannot be treated as a species of the royal 
prerogative . . . [w]hile the executive power may derive some of its content by 
reference to the royal prerogative, it is a power conferred as part of a negotiated 
federal compact expressed in a written Constitution distributing powers between 
the three arms of government . . . .‖ Id.  
49. Id. at 19 (Black, J., dissenting). The Prerogative Power, or the Royal 
Prerogative, is the concept that various powers rest exclusively with the Crown, 
such as the power to declare war or make treaties. TONY BLACKSHIELD & GEORGE 
WILLIAMS, AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THEORY 261 (2006). 
Prerogative powers were derived from common law, and can be superseded by 
statute or lost over time from lack of use. Id. 
50. Ruddock, 183 A.L.R. at 19 (Black, J., dissenting).  
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power under Section 61 of the Australian Commonwealth 
Constitution. First, the executive power may be understood in 
comparison with its U.S. counterpart because Section 61 was derived 
from Article II of the U.S. Constitution.51 Additionally, Australia 
adopted a separation of powers model of government similar to that 
of the U.S.52 Under the American model, the executive power of the 
president is an implied power; it is the power necessary to execute the 
laws and check the powers of the other branches of government. The 
American governmental structure contains no lingering prerogative 
powers of the British Crown that need to be considered when the 
executive takes action, an intended consequence of the American 
Revolution.53 Applied to Australia‘s Commonwealth Constitution, 
this understanding justifies the holding in Ruddock v. Vadarlis and 
frees the court from the need to investigate any prerogative powers 
held at common law by ―constitutionalizing‖ an implied executive 
power.54  
A second, divergent understanding of the executive power under 
Section 61 is through the lens of British and colonial history. The 
basic constitutional structure of the British Empire was established by 
the mid-nineteenth century with an ―Imperial Parliament‖ as 
sovereign, the monarch acting on the advice of her UK ministers, and 
each minister represented in each colony by a governor with 
delegated authority.55 Therefore, at the time of federation, all 
prerogative powers were ―Imperial prerogative powers‖ exercised by 
the Queen unless they were abrogated by legislation.56 Under this 
framework, the common law prerogative was intended to form part of 
the executive power of the Commonwealth and cannot be separated 
or ―constitutionalized‖ as previously suggested. Accordingly, 
executive power would not enjoy immunity from judicial or 
legislative restraint as embodied in the Migration Act.57 Adopting this 
interpretation of the nature of executive power could have altered the 
majority‘s opinion.   
 
51. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (―The executive Power shall be vested in a 
President of the United States of America.‖). 
52. Selway, supra note 44, at 500. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 501. 
56. Id. at 505–06. 
57. Id. at 506. 
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Following the federal court decision, the Australian Parliament 
enacted the Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement Powers) 
Act of 2001.58 This Act sought to retroactively validate any 
government actions in relation to the Tampa affair and effectively 
deny its passengers the right to claim asylum.59 Vadarlis‘ application 
for special leave to appeal to the High Court was rejected on 
November 27, 2001;60 by that time the Howard government had 
transferred the refugees from temporary detention on the Tampa to 
more permanent detention camps in third countries.  
IV. THE PACIFIC SOLUTION 
Australia‘s plans for dealing with an escalating number of boat 
people attempting to enter their territory took shape in response to the 
Tampa affair. On September 1, 2001, while the refugees lingered 
outside Australian territorial waters on the Tampa for a seventh day, 
Prime Minister John Howard held a press conference to announce a 
resolution to the standoff: 
Ladies and Gentlemen, Mr[.] Ruddock and I have called this 
news conference this morning to announce that an agreement 
has been reached so that all of the people on board the MV 
Tampa can be processed in third countries, not in Australia or 
in an Australian Territory, to have their claims for refugee 
status determined and then dealt with under the normal 
processes applying to refugees around the world.61 
 
58. The Australian Minister of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Philip 
Ruddock, MP, circulated an explanatory memorandum of the Border Protection 
Bill in the House of Representatives that plainly stated the purpose of the Act: ―The 
Bill seeks, for more abundant caution, to ensure that there is no doubt about the 
Government‘s ability to order ships to leave Australia‘s territorial waters. Provision 
is also made to avoid the possibility of legal action being taken in Australian courts 
as a result of any action taken under the Act.‖ Memorandum from Philip Ruddock, 
MP, The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia (2001), http://www.austlii. 
edu.au/cgibin/sinodisp/au/legis/cth/bill_em/bpb2001212/memo1.html?query=borde
r%20protection%20act%202001.  
59. BARRY YORK, DEP. OF THE AUSTL. PARLIAMENTARY LIBRARY, AUSTRALIA 
AND REFUGEES, 1901–2002 ANNOTATED CHRONOLOGY BASED ON OFFICIAL 
SOURCES: SUMMARY 54 (2003), http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/chron/2002-
03/03chr02.htm. This specific Act was ultimately rejected in the Senate, but some 
of its key provisions were introduced through various other measures. See infra 
note 64. 
60. Transcript of Refusal of Special Leave to Appeal, Vadarlis v. MIMA (High 
Court of Australia, Gaudron, Gummow, and Hayne JJ., Nov. 27, 2001) (Austlii).  
61. John Howard, Prime Minister of Australia, Joint Press Conference with the 
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The government resolved to transfer the refugees from their vessel 
to detention centers on small pacific islands for ―processing‖ rather 
than admit them and evaluate their refugee status claims within the 
ordinary Australian legal framework.  
What came to be known as the Pacific Solution was accomplished 
in three phases: (1) the excision of thousands of islands from 
Australia‘s Migration Zone to prevent the granting of due process 
rights under the Migration Act to boat people who physically reached 
these locations; (2) the interception of vessels containing asylum 
seekers by the Australian Defense Force under Operation Relex;62 
and (3) the removal of persons to third countries for processing and 
refugee status determinations.63  
On September 26, 2001, the Australian Senate passed a series of 
legislative enactments that formally launched the Pacific Solution.64 
The six Acts aimed to secure Australia‘s borders and deter unlawful 
arrivals of noncitizens. In addition to the Migration Zone changes, the 
legislation dealt with the validation and enforcement of new border 
protection measures, a new humanitarian and refugee visa regime, 
new refugee assessment criteria, mandatory sentencing for human 
traffickers, and a restrictive clause relating to judicial review of 
migration decisions.65 
 
Minister of Immigration the Hon. Philip Ruddock MP (Sept. 1, 2001), available at 
http://www.sievx.com/articles/psdp/20010901HowardRuddockConf.html.    
62. At a joint press conference with the Minister of Immigration Prime Minister 
Howard stated, ―Commencing immediately the Australian Defence Force will 
conduct enhanced surveillance, patrol and response operations in international 
waters between the Indonesian archipelago and Australia. This will involve five 
naval vessels and four P-3C Orion aircraft.‖ Id. The Prime Minister described 
Operation Relex as an ―intensification‖ of existing practice designed to deter 
people smuggling operations originating from Indonesia. Id. See also MARR & 
WILKINSON, supra note 4, at 161. 
63. Pursuant to the Migration Act, persons could henceforth be transferred at 
sea to detention centers in Nauru and Papua New Guinea. Penelope Mathew, Legal 
Issues Concerning Interception, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 221, 232–33 (2003).  
64. York, supra note 59, at 54–55. The six Acts included the Migration 
Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act 2001, the Migration Amendment 
(Excision from Migration Zone) (Consequential Provisions) Act 2001, the 
Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Act 2001, the Migration 
Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1) 2001, the Migration Legislation Amendment 
Act (No. 6) 2001, and Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement Powers) Act 
2001. Id. 
65. Id. 
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A. Excision of Territory from the Migration Zone 
The Australian government first excised Christmas Island, the 
Ashmore and Cartier Islands, and the Cocos Islands from Australia‘s 
Migration Zone.66 This action disqualified unlawfully arriving 
noncitizens from applying for visas.67 The Migration Amendment 
(Excision from Migration Zone) (Consequential Provisions) Act of 
2001 further allowed for the detention of unlawful noncitizens in 
excised offshore locations, the transfer of unlawful noncitizens from 
Australia to a third country, and the preclusion of unlawful 
noncitizens from taking legal action against the government in an 
Australian court.68  
B. Interdiction at Sea 
Under phase two of the Pacific Solution, the Australian navy 
physically intercepted and boarded the Tampa. In contrast to less 
visible forms of interception, such as carrier sanctions, visa 
procedures, or airport immigration inspection procedures that prevent 
the arrival of asylum seekers, interdiction at sea is one of the most 
far-reaching and spectacular forms of interception possible.69  
UNCLOS divides the world‘s oceans into sectors of decreasing 
levels of state jurisdiction as the distance from land increases.70 While 
the territorial sea is akin to state territory, the zones beyond that area 
allow for limited legislative jurisdiction and enforcement in regards 
to immigration powers.71 Outside of the territorial sea, states may 
exercise ―control‖ in the contiguous zone to punish or prevent 
infringement of their immigration frontiers within the territorial sea.72 
In the adjoining Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), UNCLOS does not 





69. Mathew, supra note 63, at 221–22. 
70. UNCLOS, supra note 19, arts. 2–15, 33(2), 56, 57, 86. These demarcations 
include the territorial sea (up to twelve nautical miles from the sea baseline), the 
contiguous zone (up to twenty-four nautical miles from the sea baseline), the 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) (up to 200 nautical miles from the sea baseline) 
and the High Seas (all areas beyond the zones in which states may exercise 
sovereign power). Mathew, supra note 63, at 223.     
71. Mathew, supra note 63, at 223–24. 
72. UNCLOS, supra note 19, art. 33.  
73. Id. art. 56(1)(c) (granting to states only ―sovereign rights‖ over natural 
resources).  
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certain exceptions for piracy, jurisdiction of persons rests with the 
vessel‘s flag state only.74  
In a situation where a state seeks to combat the trafficking of 
illegal migrants and has reasonable grounds to suspect that a vessel is 
smuggling people by sea ―and is without nationality or may be 
assimilated to a vessel without nationality,‖ the state may board and 
search the vessel as long as it ―take[s] appropriate measures in 
accordance with relevant domestic and international law.‖75 This is 
particularly applicable during anti-human-trafficking operations. 
However, Australia concerned itself with Indonesian vessels at this 
time, not stateless vessels.76 Australia needed to secure Indonesia‘s 
cooperation (the vessel‘s flag state) in order to interdict the Tampa on 
the High Seas, but no agreement of this kind existed at the time of the 
incident.77 Without Indonesia‘s prior consent, the interdiction 
operation amounted to unlawful interference with the passengers‘ 
freedoms under international law.78  
C. Evasion of the Refugee Convention 
For Australia, circumventing the reach of the Refugee Convention 
was the obvious advantage of an offshore interdiction policy.79 The 
Howard government understood the Refugee Convention‘s protective 
provisions to be dependent upon an individual‘s entry into Australia‘s 
physical borders.80 In fact, Article 33 offers no express language 
concerning entry.81 Article 33 affirms that expulsion or refoulement 
of refugees in ―any manner whatsoever‖ is prohibited in order to 
protect refugees from being sent to countries that are not party to the 
Refugee Convention and might not respect the principle of 
nonrefoulement.82 If the nonrefoulement responsibility is understood 
 
74. Id. art. 6.  
75. Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants, supra note 15, art. 8(2).  
76. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
77. Mathew, supra note 63, at 226–27. 
78. A Humans Rights Watch study of Australia‘s Pacific Solution policies 
indicated that Indonesia was merely notified when Australia began intercepting and 
returning boats to Indonesia. Id. at 227–28 (citing HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BY 
INVITATION ONLY: AUSTRALIAN ASYLUM POLICY 45 (2002)). Australia apparently 
relied on Indonesia not to assert its rights under international law, perhaps because 
of the involvement of human traffickers. Mathew, supra note 63, at 228. 
79. Mathew, supra note 63, at 228–29. 
80. Id. 
81. Refugee Convention, supra note 2, art. 33. 
82. Mathew, supra note 63, at 229. 
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as an obligation of conduct as well as result, then a country may be in 
breach of the Refugee Convention if it fails to ensure that the 
refugees it discharges will not be protected from refoulement 
elsewhere in third countries.83 During the Tampa incident, Australia 
adopted a position that entry into its territory was essential to the 
reach of the Refugee Convention, but the practice of potential chain-
refoulement that it engaged in may be a separate and independent 
violation of international law.84   
D. Indefinite Detention in Third Countries 
Under phase three of the Pacific Solution, the Australian navy 
transferred the refugees aboard the Tampa to the HMAS Manoora, a 
Royal Australian Navy vessel. The refugees were transported by the 
navy, processed, and housed in detention centers in Nauru and Papua 
New Guinea.  
A crucial question is whether detained persons may be transferred 
to a third country without their consent. The UDHR affirms the right 
of every human being to seek asylum,85 and the ICCPR grants the 
right to liberty86 and the right to leave one‘s own country.87 Neither 
general human rights treaties nor the Refugee Convention, however, 
grant a person an exclusive right of entry or the right to be granted 
asylum in a particular country.88 As a matter of international refugee 
law, relocating asylum seekers intercepted at sea to third countries—
even without their consent—might be permissible as long as the 
Refugee Convention‘s bar against refoulement has been met.89 
Australia took this posture as an issue of sovereign right.   
Whether a right exists to choose the country of asylum is an issue 
on which the Refugee Convention is also silent. Australia‘s actions, 
however, raise good faith issues regarding the circumvention of 
Article 31 of the Convention. This Article prohibits a state from 
penalizing refugees ―on account of their illegal entry or presence‖ or 
 
83. Id. 
84. Id. But see Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993) 
(holding that the interdiction of Haitian boat people on the High Seas was 
permissible because neither the Refugee Convention nor the relevant U.S. statute 
extended to persons outside U.S. territory).  
85. UDHR, supra note 34, art. 14.            
86. ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 9. 
87. Id. art. 12.  
88. Mathew, supra note 63, at 234. 
89. See Refugee Convention, supra note 2, art. 33. 
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from applying ―to the movements of such refugees[‗] restrictions.‖90 
Article 31 applies to persons present within state territory.91 Thus, if 
the territorial sea where the Tampa was seized is assimilated to state 
territory,92 then the refugees were arguably penalized in violation of 
the Refugee Convention, and their freedom of movement unlawfully 
restricted under international law. Alternatively, Australia might 
argue that a transfer to a third country participating in its Pacific 
Solution fulfilled the requirements of Article 31 and the right to seek 
asylum protected under Article 14 of the UDHR93 because the 
refugees were delivered to a safe haven. The reality, however, is that 
the refugees were detained in Nauru or Papua New Guinea with their 
final destinations left uncertain, and any hope for resettlement in a 
third country was unclear. 94 At minimum, Pacific Solution 
agreements with third countries did state that Australia would take 
responsibility for any asylum seekers ultimately left unsettled.95 
Even if the Refugee Convention does not expressly prohibit this 
manner of open-ended, indefinite detention of asylum seekers, other 
international human rights that supersede domestic legal decisions 
may check a state policy of this kind. For example, there may be a 
right of entry into a country in cases involving torture or family ties 
considerations, or a right to humane conditions in the detention 
facilities themselves.96 Finally, the right to individual liberty under 
the UDHR appears particularly threatened. The detention of persons 
until such time as the ―vagaries of international relations‖ dictate 
their reception somewhere else is an unacceptable proposition.97   
V. CONCLUSION  
Australia‘s 2001 Howard government decided that the primary 
function of its refugee policy was not to provide humanitarian 
assistance and relieve the suffering of refugees fleeing far off war-
torn countries but to protect its nation‘s borders against unwanted 
migrants. No evident policy goal of deterring human rights violations 
was apparent. Quite the reverse: Australia‘s ad hoc policy towards 
 
90. Id. art. 31. 
91. UNCLOS, supra note 19, art. 31.  
92. See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text. 
93. UDHR, supra note 34.            
94. Mathew, supra note 63, at 235. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 235–36. 
97. Id. at 236 (citing Amuur v. France, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. 533, para. 48 (1996)). 
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arriving boat people, reflected in the handling of the Tampa affair and 
the hastily prepared Pacific Solution, indicated a policy of national 
self-interest above all other concerns and election politics pursued in 
the name of sovereignty.98 More importantly, the Tampa proceedings 
revealed a lack of justiciability of international norms in Australian 
courts. The government‘s refusal to allow asylum seekers to access 
its borders likely violated its international legal obligations to the 
principle of nonrefoulement.  
The future of international refugee protection depends upon a 
reaffirmation of the Refugee Convention and efforts to address 
restrictive interpretations placed on its principles by individual 
states.99 Remaining gaps can be filled through the protections 
provided to vulnerable refugees in additional international 
agreements, such as the UDHR, ICCPR, CRC, and OPCAT. These 
and other international conventions should be strengthened through 
continued adherence to their standards and equally severe 
condemnation and sanction of states that fail to meet their 
obligations. The purpose of international law is to govern relations 
between sovereign states and disallow individual national interests to 
countermand obligations entered into with the international 
community.  
The story of Australia‘s experience with boat people is replete with 
occurrences that fall short of good sense and civilized expectation in 
the area of human rights and international refugee law. The Howard 
government was unapologetic about its goals of deterring unwanted 
boat people and the denial of access to domestic asylum rights. It 
took six more years, but following the election of the Australian 
Labor Party in 2007, the notorious Pacific Solution was quietly 
abandoned. 
 
98. See James C. Hathaway, A Reconsideration of the Underlying Premise of 
Refugee Law, 31 HARV. INT‘L L.J. 129, 167–68 (1990) (arguing that the 
responsibility for protecting refugees under the 1951 Convention was formally 
placed in the hands of individual states, and not the UNHCR, thus allowing 
―political and strategic interests to override humanitarian concerns in the 
determination of refugee status . . . undercutting the university of the protection 
mandate‖). 
99. See Erika Feller, The Evolution of the International Refugee Protection 
Regime, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POL‘Y 129 (2001). 
